

1 early ruling of likelihood of success on the merits. Epic Games has strong arguments regarding
 2 Apple’s exclusive distribution through the iOS App Store, and the in-app purchase (“IAP”) system
 3 through which Apple takes 30% of certain IAP payments. However, given the limited record,
 4 Epic Games has not sufficiently addressed Apple’s counter arguments. The equities, addressed in
 5 the temporary restraining order, remain the same.

6 **I. BACKGROUND**

7 The Court summarizes the limited record before it on this motion for preliminary
 8 injunction. To expedite issuance of this Order, the Court cites to some of the basic background
 9 from its prior order² as the background is equally relevant here. The Court notes disputes in the
 10 evidence where otherwise appropriate.

11 **A. The Players**

12 With respect to Epic Games:

13 Epic Games is a United States-based tech-company that specializes in
 14 video games, including, as relevant here, the popular multi-platform³
 15 game, *Fortnite*. *Fortnite* is structured around “seasons,” whereby
 16 narratives, themes, and events are introduced for a limited time.
 17 Cross-platform play is enabled for all users so long as those users
 18 remain on the same version of the game. . . .

19 Epic Games International, S.a.r.l (“Epic International”) is a related
 20 company based in Switzerland and hosts, among others, the Unreal
 21 Engine. The Unreal Engine is a graphics engine created by Epic
 22 International to assist in its development of video games that it later
 23 began licensing to other developers. The Unreal Engine 4, the current
 24 version of the engine on the market, is used by third-party developers
 25 for the development of video games for both console and mobile

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 22 STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, (Oct. 6, 2020). The Court finds it appropriate to take
 23 judicial notice of public documents generated by Congress, although the Court does not consider
 24 the content therein for purposes of this motion. *See Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l*
 25 *Hosp.*, 65 F. Supp. 3d 932, 942-43 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that court can take notice of “[o]fficial
 26 acts of legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States”); *Del Puerto Water*
 27 *Dist. v United States Bur. of Reclamation*, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (taking
 28 judicial notice of House Reports).

² *See Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc.*, 4:20-cv-05640-YGR, 2020 WL 5073937 (N.D. Cal.
 Aug. 24, 2020) (Dkt. No. 48).

³ These platforms include Android, iOS, macOS, Windows, Sony PlayStation 4, Microsoft
 Xbox One, Nintendo Switch. *Fortnite* is also available for download through the Epic Games
 Store, as discussed herein.

1 platforms, including for games currently offered in the iPhone App
2 Store. These third parties range from smaller game developers to
3 larger corporations, such as Microsoft Corporation. The Unreal
4 Engine has also been used by third parties for architecture projects,
5 film and television production, and medical training.

6 *Epic Games*, 2020 WL 5073937 at *1 (Dkt. No. 48 at 2). Epic Games has released twenty-five
7 (25) updates to Unreal Engine since 2014, and anticipates releasing future updates to ensure that
8 Unreal Engine remains compatible with new versions of Apple’s software, such as the now
9 released iOS 14. Developers can use Unreal Engine commercially on a royalty model or
10 negotiated license, but it is otherwise free for non-commercial use. Although more applications on
11 the iOS platform are powered by a rival game engine, Unity, a significant number of iOS
12 applications are constructed based on Unreal Engine, including *Fortnite* competitor
13 *PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds* (“PUBG”).

14 Epic Games also maintains or controls other affiliates including: Epic International, Life
15 on Air, Inc. (both in San Francisco, California and Austin, Texas), KA-RA S.a.r.l., Psyonix LLC,
16 and Quixel AB (collectively, “Epic Affiliates”). The Epic Affiliates maintain control over certain
17 applications and software within the Epic Games business. These identified applications include:
18 Unreal Engine, Unreal Remote 2, Unreal Match 3, Action RPG Game Sample, Unreal Remote,
19 Live Link Face, and House Party, among others. Meanwhile, Epic Games itself controls *Battle*
20 *Breakers*, *Infinity Blade Stickers*, *Spyjinx*, and, as relevant here, *Fortnite*.

21 Beyond these games and applications, Epic Games also operates a digital marketplace to
22 sell game software called the Epic Games Store. As pled in the operative complaint: the Epic
23 Games Store was created to compete against the leading multi-publisher digital video game
24 marketplace on computer platforms, Steam, which is operated by Valve Corporation. The Epic
25 Games Store provides access to more than 250 games from more than 200 developers. Like other
26 video game digital distribution platforms, the Epic Games Store offers personalized features,
27 including friends list management and game matchmaking services. As alleged, absent Apple’s
28 alleged anti-competitive conduct, Epic Games would also create an analogous Epic Games Store
for the iOS platform independent of Apple’s digital marketplace.

1 With respect to Apple:

2 Apple is a ubiquitous tech-company that makes products ranging
3 from hardware to software. Apple, as relevant here, maintains an App
4 Store for the iOS platform that is geared for its mobile devices, the
5 iPhones [and iPads]. The App Store allows third-party developers an
6 opportunity to create and thereafter sell applications to iPhone [and
7 iPad] users. Apple generally takes 30% of the sale of the application
8 or of the IAP made within the third-party application itself. Apple's
9 agreements with developers and the App Store guidelines do not
10 generally permit third-party developers to circumvent the IAP system.

11 *Id.* at *2 (Dkt. No. 48 at 2). In addition to preventing developers from circumventing the IAP
12 system, developers are also prohibited from distributing applications outside of the App Store on
13 the iOS platform.⁴ In short: Apple maintains the iOS platform as a walled garden or closed
14 platform model, whereby Apple has strict and exclusive control over the hardware, the operating
15 system, the digital distribution, and the IAP system.

16 In order to access the App Store and to obtain developer tools, developers are required to
17 comply with Apple's rules and regulations through a web of agreements and guidelines:

18 As relevant here, Apple maintains separate developer agreements and
19 developer program licensing agreements between Epic Games, Epic
20 International and four other affiliated entities. Apple also maintains
21 a separate agreement, "Xcode and Apple SDKs Agreement,"
22 regarding its developer tools (software development kits, or "SDKs").

23 *Epic Games*, 2020 WL 5073937 at *1 (Dkt. No. 48 at 2-3). These agreements have broad
24 language including terminable at-will clauses.⁵

25 The relationship between Epic Games and Apple dates to at least 2011, when Epic Games
26 released its first *Infinity Blade* game on the iOS platform. Epic Games and Apple collaborated for
27 several Apple events, showcasing Epic Games' iOS games and the earlier iterations of the Unreal
28 Engine running on the iOS and macOS platforms. Following the success of *Fortnite* on other

24 ⁴ For purposes of this motion, the parties refer to the operating system for both iPhones
25 and iPads as iOS. (*See* Opp'n at 4, n.2 (Dkt. No. 73 at 10).) Moreover, Epic Games pleads that
26 there are no differences between iOS and iPadOS to the allegations in the complaint. (Compl. ¶
27 39, n.1 (Dkt. No. 1).) Similarly, this Order refers to iOS to refer to both the iPhone and iPad
28 platforms, and references to iPhones generally also apply to iPads.

⁵ The record also contains two enterprise account agreements for Epic Games and
YEVVO Entertainment, Inc. The parties do not otherwise discuss the significance of these
agreements.

1 video game platforms, Epic Games launched *Fortnite* on iOS in April 2018, where it remained on
2 the platform until, as discussed below, August 13, 2020. During this time period: (i) 116 million
3 iOS device users accessed *Fortnite*, spending more than 2.86 billion hours in the game; (ii) the
4 daily average users numbered approximately 2.5 million daily iOS players, representing nearly
5 10% of *Fortnite*'s total average daily players; and (iii) 63% of iOS players on *Fortnite* have only
6 accessed *Fortnite* from an iOS device. Finally, iOS users accounted for more IAPs within
7 *Fortnite* than those on the Android platform, but iOS users spend less on IAPs than those on the
8 console platforms, including the Sony PlayStation 4 and Microsoft Xbox One.

9 **B. Relevant Background**

10 On June 30, 2020, the developer program licensing agreements for the Epic Games
11 account, the Epic International account, KA-RA S.a.r.l. account, and the Epic Games enterprise
12 account were renewed by the payment of separate consideration.⁶ That same day, Epic Games
13 founder and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Tim Sweeney sent an email to Apple executives,
14 including Apple CEO Tim Cook, requesting the ability to offer iOS consumers: (1) competing
15 payment processing options, “other than Apple payments, without Apple’s fees, in *Fortnite* and
16 other Epic Games software distributed through the iOS App Store”; and (2) a competing Epic
17 Games Store app “available through the iOS App Store and through direct installation that has
18 equal access to underlying operating system features for software installation and update as the
19 iOS App Store itself has, including the ability to install and update software as seamlessly as the
20 iOS App Store experience.” (Sweeney Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. A (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 2).) Mr. Sweeney
21 highlights that these two offerings would allow consumers to pay less for digital products, and
22 allow developers to earn more money. Mr. Sweeney also wrote that he “hope[d] that Apple
23 w[ould] also make these options equally available to all iOS developers in order to make software
24 sales and distribution on the iOS platform as open and competitive as it is on personal computers.”
25 (*Id.*) In this email, Mr. Sweeney does not provide any offer to pay Apple any portion of the 30

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28 ⁶ The renewal price for the enterprise accounts were each \$299; the other agreements were each renewed at a price of \$99.

1 percent it charges on either app distribution or for IAP.

2 On July 10, 2020, Apple Vice President and Associate General Counsel Douglas G. Vetter
3 responded to Mr. Sweeney's email with a formal letter. In short, Apple's response to Epic Games'
4 requests was no. Both requests were unequivocally refused. (Sweeney Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. B (Dkt.
5 No. 65-2).) As relevant here and with respect to the Epic Games Store request, Mr. Vetter wrote:

6 Apple has never allowed this. Not when we launched the App Store
7 in 2008. Not now. We understand this might be in Epic's financial
8 interests, but Apple strongly believes these rules are vital to the health
9 of the Apple platform and carry enormous benefits for both
10 consumers and developers. The guiding principle of the App Store is
to provide a safe, secure and reliable experience for users and a great
opportunity for all developers to be successful but, to be clear, when
it comes to striking the balance, Apple errs on the side of the
consumer.

11 (*Id.*) Mr. Vetter also reiterated that Epic Games' request to establish a separate payment processor
12 would interfere with Apple's own IAP system, the business model of which has been used in the
13 App Store since its inception. (*Id.*)

14 On July 17, 2020 Mr. Sweeney responded to what he described as a "self-righteous and
15 self-serving screed," writing that he hoped "Apple someday chooses to return to its roots building
16 open platforms in which consumers have freedom to install software from sources of their
17 choosing, and developers can reach consumers and do business directly without intermediation."
18 (Sweeney Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. C (Dkt. No. 65-3 at 2).) He stated that Epic Games "is in a state of
19 substantial disagreement with Apple's policy and practices," and promised that it would "continue
20 to pursue this, as [it] ha[s] done in the past to address other injustices in [the] industry." (*Id.*)

21 In fulfilling Mr. Sweeney's promise to "pursue this" perceived "injustice," Epic Games
22 covertly introduced a "hotfix" into the *Fortnite* version 13.40 update on August 3, 2020. Epic
23 Games did not disclose the full extent of this hotfix to Apple, namely that this hotfix would enable
24 a significant and substantive feature to *Fortnite* permitting a direct pay option to Epic Games that
25 would be activated when signaled by Epic Games' servers. Until this signal was sent out, this
26 direct pay option would remain dormant. When activated, however, this direct pay option would
27 allow iOS *Fortnite* players to choose a direct pay option that would circumvent Apple's IAP
28 system. Relying on the representations, that intentionally omitted the full extent and disclosure of

1 this hotfix, Apple approved of the *Fortnite* version 13.40 to the App Store.⁷

2 The hotfix remained inactive until the early morning of August 13, 2020, when Epic
3 Games made the calculated decision to breach its allegedly illegal agreements with Apple by
4 activating the undisclosed code in *Fortnite*, allowing Epic Games to collect IAPs directly.
5 *Fortnite* remained on the App Store until later that morning, when Apple removed *Fortnite* from
6 the App Store, where it remains unavailable. Later that same day, Epic Games filed this action
7 and began a pre-planned, and blistering, marketing campaign against Apple. This marketing
8 campaign included: a large-scale twitter campaign, a releasing of a parody video of the iconic
9 Apple 1984 commercial, a *Fortnite* tournament in support of its lawsuit with in-game prizes, and a
10 releasing of a limited time skin in *Fortnite* called the Tart Tycoon,⁸ among other actions.

11 The following day, Apple responded sternly. It informed Epic Games that, based on its
12 breaches of the App Store guidelines, and the developer program license agreement, it would be
13 revoking all developer tools, which would preclude updates for its programs and software. Apple
14 gave two weeks to comply with the App Store guidelines and the agreements. Apple also
15 identified general consequences for any failure to comply, but specifically cited Unreal Engine as
16 potentially being subject to harm should Epic Games fail to comply within the two-week period.

17 Thereafter on August 17, 2020, Epic Games filed the request for a temporary restraining
18 order, requesting the reinstatement of *Fortnite* with its activated hotfix onto the App Store, and to
19 enjoin Apple from revoking the developer tools belonging to the Epic Affiliates. The Court
20 declined to reinstate *Fortnite* onto the App Store, but temporarily restrained Apple from taking any
21 action with respect to the Epic Affiliates' developer tools and accounts.

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23 ⁷ Epic Games disputes that its use of the hotfix was deceptive where it is common practice
24 in the gaming and software industry. The deceptive conduct does not derive from Epic Games'
25 use of the hotfix specifically, but from using a hotfix to clandestinely add features in violation of
26 the guidelines and its agreements with Apple, and then failing to disclose such code. Moreover,
27 Epic Games did this despite receiving an unambiguous refusal from Apple only a few weeks prior
28 to the introduction of its hotfix. The record further reflects that while hotfixes are commonly used
in the industry, their uses are generally to fix or patch critical bugs or defects—not to enact
substantive and significant new features. Epic Games' adamant refusal to understand this basic
distinction is not only baffling, but undermines its credibility with this Court.

⁸ Modeled presumably on Mr. Cook's likeness.

1 On August 27, 2020, as planned by Epic Games, an updated version containing season four
2 of *Fortnite* was released on all platforms except for the iOS platform, which Epic Games could no
3 longer update due to its breaches of the Apple agreements and guidelines. By design, *Fortnite*
4 users can only play amongst other users currently operating the same version. Because of this
5 release, iOS *Fortnite* players no longer had the ability to play cross-platform with other players
6 (unless these players chose not to update their version, forgoing playing the new season).

7 On August 28, 2020, on the expiration of the two-week deadline, Apple terminated Epic
8 Games' developer program account, referenced as Team ID '84, stating "Apple is exercising its
9 right in Apple's sole discretion to terminate your status as a registered Apple Developer pursuant
10 to the Apple Developer Agreement and is terminating the Developer Agreement and the Program
11 License Agreement pursuant to their terms. . . . [W]e will deny your reapplication to the Apple
12 Developer Program for at least a year." (Grant Decl. ¶ 35, Ex. H (Dkt. No. 63-8 at 2).)⁹

13 Following this, the parties engaged in briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction on
14 a slightly expedited basis. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on September 28, 2020.

15 **II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

16 Preliminary injunctive relief, whether in the form of a temporary restraining order or a
17 preliminary injunction, is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy," that is never awarded as of right.
18 *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (internal citations omitted). "It is so well settled as
19 not to require citation of authority that the usual function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve
20 the status quo ante litem pending a determination of the action on the merits." *Tanner Motor*
21 *Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc.*, 316 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1963). A preliminary injunction is "not a
22 preliminary adjudication on the merits but rather a device for preserving the status quo and
23 preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment." *Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix*
24 *Software, Inc.*, 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

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27 ⁹ The record also reflects that Apple made moves in early September to cancel Epic
28 Games' ability to use the Sign in with Apple ("SIWA") on the *Fortnite* game. Apple eventually
relented to allowing its continued use without waiving any right to revoke SIWA in the future.

1 In order to obtain such relief, plaintiffs must establish four factors: (1) they are likely to
2 succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
3 relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.
4 *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). With respect to the success on
5 the merits and balance of harms factors, courts permit a strong showing on one factor to offset a
6 weaker showing on the other, so long as all four factors are established. *Alliance for the Wild
7 Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In other words, “if a plaintiff can only
8 show that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of
9 success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips
10 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two *Winter* factors are satisfied.” *Shell Offshore, Inc.
11 v. Greenpeace, Inc.*, 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted). Thus,
12 under the Ninth Circuit’s “‘sliding scale’ approach to these factors,” “when the balance of
13 hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff need demonstrate only ‘serious
14 questions going to the merits.’” *hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 938 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir.
15 2019) (quoting *Alliance for the Wild Rockies*, 632 F.3d at 1131). The Court addresses each.

16 **III. ANALYSIS**

17 The Court finds it appropriate to evaluate, once again, Apple’s actions with respect to
18 (i) Epic Games specifically, including the delisting of *Fortnite* and other games authorized under
19 Epic Games’ contract with Apple, and (ii) the attempt to suspend and terminate developer rights
20 authorized under other contracts, such as the one controlling Unreal Engine.

21 **A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

22 Epic Games brings ten claims for violations of Sherman Act, the California Cartwright
23 Act, and California Unfair Competition. For purposes of the motion for preliminary injunction,
24 Epic Games focuses on two: the monopoly maintenance claim under section 2 of the Sherman
25 Act, and the tying claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, the Court cabins its
26 analysis with respect to these only. Having reviewed the limited record, while Epic Games raises
27 serious questions on the merits, the Court cannot conclude that Epic Games will likely succeed on
28 the merits of those claims. Too many unknowns remain.

1 I. *Preliminary Considerations*

2 The current legal landscape cautions against preliminarily finding antitrust violations based
3 on less than a full record. As the parties acknowledge, this matter presents questions at the
4 frontier edges of antitrust law in the United States. Simply put, no analogous authority exists.
5 The questions and issues raised in this litigation concern novel and innovative business practices
6 in the technology market that have not otherwise been the subject of antitrust litigation.¹⁰

7 As the Ninth Circuit recently recognized in *Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Inc.*,
8 “novel business practices—*especially* in technology markets—should not be ‘conclusively
9 presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
10 they have cause or the business excuse for their use.’” 969 F.3d 974, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2020)
11 (emphasis in original) (quoting *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d 34, 91 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
12 (en banc)). This is “[b]ecause innovation involves new products and business practices, courts[’]
13 and economists[’] initial understanding of these practices will skew initial likelihoods that
14 innovation is anticompetitive and the proper subject of antitrust scrutiny.” *Id.* at 991 (internal
15 quotation marks omitted) (quoting Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, *Innovation and the
16 Limits of Antitrust*, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 153, 167 (2010)); *see also* Rachel S. Tennis &
17 Alexander Baier Schwab, *Business Model Innovation and Antitrust Law*, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 307,
18 319 (2012) (explaining how “antitrust economists, and in turn lawyers and judges, tend to treat
19 novel products or business practices as anticompetitive” and “are likely to decide cases wrongly in
20 rapidly changing dynamic markets,” which can have long-lasting effects particularly in
21 technological markets, where innovation “is essential to economic growth and social welfare” and
22 “an erroneous decision will deny large consumer benefits”). The Court therefore has an even
23 greater obligation to conduct an “elaborate inquiry” before determining that the alleged practices

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25 ¹⁰ The exceptions involve the related *In re Apple Antitrust*, 4:11-cv-06714-YGR (N.D.
26 Cal.) (*Pepper*), and *Donald Cameron v. Apple Inc.*, 4:19-cv-03074-YGR (N.D. Cal.), matters that
27 are currently before this Court. Both *Pepper* and *Cameron* are in the middle of discovery, with
28 motions for class certification anticipated in early 2021. No substantive rulings as to the merits of
the claims have otherwise been made in those cases. Similar issues arise in *Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC*, 3:20-cv-05671-JD (N.D. Cal.), filed at the same time but which does not have similar motions for preliminary injunctive relief.

1 violate antitrust law.

2 Second, the record remains insufficient to conclude that Epic Games will likely succeed on
3 the merits of its claims. As discussed below, the record includes conflicting evidence in support
4 of both Epic Games and Apple; a lack of crucial evidence without which the merits cannot be
5 determined; and fundamental disagreement by expert witnesses that is not resolvable at this stage
6 of the case. With respect to the last, the Court highlights that the parties’ retained expert witnesses
7 are all accomplished and distinguished individuals. Epic Games submits declarations from Dr.
8 David S. Evans, an economist with degrees from the University of Chicago, whose scholarly work
9 has been widely read and cited, including by the Supreme Court in *Ohio v. American Express Co.*,
10 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (*Amex*). Apple submits declarations from Dr. Richard Schmalensee—an
11 economist with degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), whose work is
12 also widely read and cited, including in *Amex* and *Microsoft*—and Dr. Lorin Hitt—an academic
13 with a business management background and degrees from MIT and Brown University, who has
14 background in electrical engineering and technology. These expert reports reflect fundamental
15 disagreements from luminaries in the field as to the foundational questions of this matter. While
16 ultimately one view will likely prevail, at this juncture, the Court concludes that reasonable minds
17 differ.

18 With these considerations in mind, the Court turns to the merits of the claims.

19 2. *Monopoly Maintenance under Section 2 of the Sherman Act*¹¹

20 a. Legal Framework

21 In order to prevail on its theory that Apple engaged in unlawful monopolization under
22 section 2 of the Sherman Act, Epic Games must show: “(a) the possession of monopoly power in
23 the relevant market; (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; and (c) causal
24 antitrust injury.” *Qualcomm*, 969 F.3d at 990 (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also United*
25 *States v. Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (stating that a section 2 claim requires “(1)

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27 ¹¹ The Court’s discussion of the section 2 claim before the section 1 claim mirrors the
28 parties’ briefing.

1 the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
2 maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
3 superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”).

4 “A threshold step in any antitrust case is to accurately define the relevant market, which
5 refers to ‘the area of effective competition.’” *Qualcomm*, 969 F.3d at 992 (quoting *Amex*, 138 S.
6 Ct. at 2285); *see also Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th
7 Cir. 1997) (“The relevant market is the field in which meaningful competition is said to exist.”).
8 Monopoly power under the first element can be defined as “the power to control prices or exclude
9 competition”¹² and may be inferred from defendant’s predominant market share in the relevant
10 market. *Grinnell*, 384 U.S. at 571. In addition, “courts usually cannot properly apply the rule of
11 reason without an accurate definition of the relevant market.” *Amex*, 138 S. Ct. at 2285. Without
12 a relevant market definition, “there is no way to measure the defendant’s ability to lessen or
13 destroy competition.” *Id.* (brackets and citation omitted).

14 “The relevant market must include both a geographic market and a product market.” *Hicks*
15 *v. PGA Tour, Inc.*, 897 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2018). The latter “must encompass the product
16 at issue as well as all economic substitutes for the product.” *Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office*
17 *Sol.*, 513 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008); *see also id.* (“The consumers do not define the
18 boundaries of the market; the products or producers do [and] the market must encompass the
19 product at issue as well as all economic substitutes for the product.”). “Economic substitutes have
20 a ‘reasonable interchangeability of use’ or sufficient ‘cross-elasticity of demand’ with the relevant
21 product.” *Hicks*, 897 F.3d at 1120 (quoting *Newcal*, 513 F.3d at 1045); *see also United States v.*
22 *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). “Including economic substitutes
23 ensures that the relevant product market encompasses ‘the group or groups of sellers or producers
24 who have actual or potential ability to deprive each other of significant levels of business.’”
25 *Hicks*, 897 F.3d at 1120 (quoting *Newcal*, 513 F.3d at 1045); *see also Du Pont*, 351 U.S. at 393

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¹² More precisely, “a firm is a monopolist if it can profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive level.” *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 51.

1 (“Illegal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive market for the product.”).

2 “[I]n some instances one brand of a product can constitute a separate market.” *See*
 3 *Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.*, 504 U.S. 451, 482 (1992); *see also Newcal*, 513
 4 F.3d at 1048 (“[T]he law permits an antitrust claimant to restrict the relevant market to a single
 5 brand of the product at issue . . .”). However, such “[s]ingle-brand markets are, at a minimum,
 6 extremely rare” and courts have rejected such market definitions “[e]ven where brand loyalty is
 7 intense.” *Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp.*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (internal
 8 quotation marks omitted). *But see id.* (“Antitrust markets consisting of just a single brand,
 9 however, are not per se prohibited In theory, it may be possible that, in rare and unforeseen
 10 circumstances, a relevant market may consist of only one brand of a product.”)

11 Nevertheless, “it is legally permissible to premise antitrust allegations on a submarket” or
 12 an aftermarket. *Newcal*, 513 F.3d at 1045. A submarket “is economically distinct from the
 13 general product market.” *Id.* at 1045. There are “several ‘practical indicia’ of an economically
 14 distinct submarket,” including:

15 industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate
 16 economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses,
 17 unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
 sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.

18 *Id.* (quoting *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)).¹³ An aftermarket is
 19 “wholly derivative from and dependent on the primary market.” *Id.* at 1049. An aftermarket may
 20 constitute the relevant market where market imperfections, such as information and switching
 21 costs, “prevent consumers from realizing that their choice in the initial market will impact their
 22 freedom to shop in the aftermarket.” *Id.* at 1050. Thus, “[d]etermining the relevant market can
 23 involve a complicated economic analysis, including concepts like cross-elasticity of demand, and
 24 ‘small but significant nontransitory increase in price’ (‘SSNIP’) analysis.” *Theme Promotions,*
 25 *Inc. v. News America Marketing FSI*, 546 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008); *see also Psystar*, 586 F.

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 28 ¹³ Epic Games’ economic expert does not address these factors; instead, he principally
 relies on the those that follow.

1 Supp. 2d at 1198.

2 The determination of a “relevant market” is a highly factual question. *See Eastman Kodak*,
 3 504 U.S. at 482 (“The proper market definition in this case can be determined only after a factual
 4 inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced by consumers.”); *see also Newcal*, 513 F.3d at 1051
 5 (“The actual existence of an aftermarket . . . is a factual question. The actual existence of a
 6 separate economic entity (i.e. a submarket) . . . is a factual question. The actual existence of [a
 7 party’s] market power within the alleged submarket is a factual question. . . . The initial market’s
 8 actual ability, through cross-elasticity of demand, to discipline anti-competitive conduct in the
 9 aftermarket is a factual question.”); *Teradata Corp. v. SAP SE*, Case No. 18-cv-03670-WHO,
 10 2018 WL 6528009, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018) (“The definition of a ‘relevant market’ in
 11 which defendant has market power is typically a factual rather than legal question.”).¹⁴

12 Even if a plaintiff establishes monopoly power in the relevant market under the first
 13 element, courts will not condemn it unless “it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive
 14 *conduct*” under the second element. *Qualcomm*, 969 F.3d at 990 (emphasis in original) (quoting
 15 *Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP*, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)). “The
 16 mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is . . . an
 17 important element of the free market system.” *Verizon Commc’ns*, 540 U.S. at 407. Thus, courts
 18 distinguish between “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power” from “growth
 19 or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
 20 *See Grinnell*, 384 U.S. at 571. To demonstrate the former, plaintiff must show “anticompetitive
 21 abuse or leverage of monopoly power, or a predatory or exclusionary means of attempting to
 22 monopolize the relevant market.” *Qualcomm*, 969 F.3d at 990. “To be condemned as
 23 exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect’—that is, it must harm the
 24 competitive process and thereby harm consumers[, i]n contrast [to] harm to one or more

25 _____
 26 ¹⁴ The parties are reminded that *Newcal* was decided on a motion to dismiss and has
 27 limited reach. The Ninth Circuit explicitly indicated that the case is not “guarantee[d]” to survive
 28 a motion for summary judgment because the “actual existence of a separate economic entity (i.e. a
 submarket) that includes only IKON’s customers is a factual question.” 513 F.3d at 1051. The
 same is true of *Teradata* and *Psystar*. The Court relies on each for those limited propositions.

1 competitors[, which] will not suffice.” *Id.* (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and
2 alternations omitted) (quoting *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 58).

3 Anticompetitive conduct is evaluated under the “rule of reason.” *Id.* at 991. First, plaintiff
4 must show “diminished consumer choices and increased prices” as “the result of a less competitive
5 market due to either artificial restrains or predatory or exclusionary conduct” by the defendant. *Id.*
6 Then, “if a plaintiff successfully establishes a *prima facie* case . . . by demonstrating
7 anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may offer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its
8 conduct.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 59). For
9 example, the monopolist may show “that its conduct is . . . a form of competition on the merits
10 because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal.” *Id.* (internal
11 quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 59). Finally, if defendant offers a non-
12 pretextual procompetitive justification, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut defendant’s
13 claim or “demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive
14 benefit.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 59).

15 Last, if plaintiff satisfies the first and second elements of monopoly power and willful
16 maintenance or acquisition of that power in the relevant market, the last element of causation may
17 be inferred “when exclusionary conduct is aimed at producers of nascent competitive technologies
18 as well as when it is aimed at producers of established substitutes.” *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 79
19 (cited with approval by *Qualcomm*, 969 F.3d at 992).

20 *b. Relevant Market Analysis*

21 In summary, the record does not yet establish how the “relevant market” should be defined.
22 Without a definition of the relevant market, the existence of market power—the foundation of a
23 monopolization claim—cannot be assessed. Accordingly, Epic Games has not yet shown that it
24 will likely succeed on the merits of the monopolization claim.

25 The relevant market must include both a geographic market and a product market.
26 Unsurprisingly, the parties disagree on the product market.¹⁵ Epic Games avers that the relevant

27
28 ¹⁵ Both Epic Games and Apple agree, however, that the “geographic market” is likely global. (*But see* Evans Decl. at 10 n.37 (Dkt. No. 62 at 12) (reserving future opinion on whether

1 product market is the market for distribution of apps on the iOS software platform, which it refers
 2 to as the “iOS App Distribution Market.” Thus, Epic Games narrows the relevant market to
 3 consider only how *iOS* apps are distributed on the *iOS* platform. Apple meanwhile asserts that the
 4 relevant market *must* include competing platforms on which *Fortnite* is distributed and monetized.
 5 In other words, Apple argues that the Court must consider the wider video game market and
 6 distribution on other platforms, including the Microsoft Xbox One, the Sony PlayStation 4, the
 7 Nintendo Switch, computer platforms (Microsoft Windows PCs, macOS computers), and tablets
 8 (Google Android and Microsoft Surface). Thus, Apple seeks a broader market definition that
 9 includes the digital distribution of video games across all video game platforms. Ultimately, the
 10 Court must discern where competition exists and whether such competition is sufficient to impact
 11 price and discipline market players.

12 Epic Games’ relevant market definition that iOS App Distribution is an “aftermarket” of
 13 the smartphone OS market is plausible.¹⁶ *See Newcal*, 513 F.3d at 1050. However, in some ways,
 14 Epic Games offers a failsafe definition by restricting the market so narrowly. By definition, Epic
 15 Games’ proposed market definition excludes other smartphone systems, including the Google
 16 Android system, as well as video game platforms and their digital distribution markets. Courts
 17 have expressly cautioned against such a narrowing of the relevant market definition. *See Du Pont*,
 18 351 U.S. at 392-93 (“A retail seller may have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade because of
 19 location . . . or because no one else makes a product of just the quality or attractiveness of his
 20 product Thus one can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every
 21 nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price and production
 22 of his own product. [However, i]llegal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive
 23 market for the product.”); *Psystar*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 (“[M]anufacturer’s own products do
 24 _____
 25 the Chinese mobile market should be included in the geographic market).)

26 ¹⁶ Apple fails to respond adequately to the “aftermarket” theory, devoting a single
 27 paragraph to it and stating, in a conclusory fashion, that “this is not an aftermarket case.” Should
 28 Epic Games continue to assert this theory, Apple should explain why switching and information
 costs do not render the IOS app distribution market distinct. Silence can be interpreted as an
 admission.

1 not themselves comprise a relevant product market.”).¹⁷

2 Moreover, Apple avers that an “aftermarket” requires user lock-in in the primary market.
3 Given the lack of legal citation, the Court surmises that this theory has not been adopted by any
4 court, even if embraced by economists. The term “lock-in” appears to derive from the Supreme
5 Court mention that “[i]f the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have purchased the
6 equipment, and are thus ‘locked in,’ will tolerate some level of service-price increases before
7 changing equipment brands.” *Eastman Kodak*, 504 U.S. at 476. In evaluating Epic Games’
8 response, resolution of the issue is focused on timing: Apple argues that consumers are not
9 locked-in to the purchase of iPhones, while Epic Games assumes the purchase and argues that
10 after the purchases occurs, a consumer is locked-in and unlikely to switch to a different
11 smartphone in response to slightly more expensive IAPs. Under the latter perspective, app
12 developers who wish to reach iOS users have no choice but to tolerate Apple’s 30% rate.¹⁸

13 Thus, at this stage of the litigation, and with the record before the Court, Apple’s relevant
14 market definition is also plausible. As Apple correctly points out, alternative means exist to
15 distribute *Fortnite*.¹⁹ Indeed, Epic Games expressly advertised the multiplatform nature of its
16 product following its breach of the Apple terms and service. (*See* Hitt Decl. ¶ 39 (Dkt. No. 77))

17
18 ¹⁷ Apple further avers that as intellectual property owner, even if it is a monopolist, Apple
19 is not required to allow unfettered and uncompensated use of its own technology. *See* Herbert
20 Hovenkamp et al., *IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual*
21 *Property Law* § 13.03 (3rd ed., 2016 & Supp. 2019) (citing *Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d at 63-
22 64). That said, “intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 64. Moreover, the parties fail to brief whether Apple possesses “essential
facilities,” which may require (compensated) access. The Court makes no express finding on
these issues, but notes these as other potential hurdles.

23 ¹⁸ The Court also leaves for another day the proper classification of the 30% at issue, that
24 is, whether it is a commission, a licensing fee, a “tax”, or a “price.” Each may have legal
ramifications which have not been fully briefed, and therefore carry with them unintended
consequences of choosing a term too quickly.

25 ¹⁹ However, the Court notes that Apple’s argument assumes a user who owns multiple
26 devices, pays attention to prices for in-app purchases, and switches devices in response to price
27 increases. There is little evidence that the ordinary iOS consumer carries such characteristics. *Cf.*
28 *U.S. v. Engelhard Corp.*, 126 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting relevant market analysis
based on customer interviews where proponent failed to show that the customers were
representative).

1 (“[The] party continues on PlayStation 4, Xbox One, Nintendo Switch, PC, Mac, GeForce Now,
2 and through both the Epic Games app at epicgames.com and the Samsung Galaxy Store.”).) The
3 multiplatform nature of *Fortnite* suggests that these other platforms and their digital distributions
4 may be economic substitutes that should be considered in any “relevant market” definition
5 because they are “reasonably interchangeable” when used “for the same purposes.” *Du Pont*, 351
6 U.S. at 395; *see also Hicks*, 897 F.3d at 1120-21 (dismissing antitrust claim when alleged relevant
7 market ignored multiple ways of reaching consumers). “If competitors can reach the ultimate
8 consumers of the product by employing existing or potential alternative channels of distribution, it
9 is unclear whether such restrictions foreclose from competition *any* part of the relevant market.”
10 *Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc.*, 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1997).

11 Epic Games’ arguments distinguishing these other platforms as potential economic
12 substitutes have not been sufficiently tested. First, Epic Games avers that the iOS market is
13 distinct from other video game platforms because Sony, Nintendo, and Microsoft do not make
14 much profit, if any, on the sale of the hardware or console—unlike Apple, which allegedly makes
15 significant profits from the sale of each iPhone. This distinction is without legal precedent under
16 section 2 of the Sherman Act. Indeed, Sony, Nintendo and Microsoft all operate similar walled
17 gardens or closed platform models as Apple, whereby the hardware, operating system, digital
18 marketplace, and IAPs are all exclusive to the platform owner. As such, a final decision should be
19 better informed regarding the impact of the walled garden model given the potential for significant
20 and serious ramifications for Sony, Nintendo and Microsoft and their video game platforms.

21 Second, Epic Games’ avers that the iOS platform is unique from other gaming devices.
22 Specifically, Epic Games argues that gaming consoles and computers require electrical outlets and
23 separate screens and thus lack capacity for mobile play, which demands portable, battery operated,
24 and cellularly connected devices with built-in screens. (*See Sweeney Reply Decl.* ¶ 14 (Dkt. No.
25 86).) Yet, Epic Games repeatedly ignored discussion of gaming laptops, tablets, and the Nintendo
26 Switch, all of which can be played in a mobile fashion. These devices could have significant
27 overlap with the iOS platform in terms of the ultimate consumer. Again, however, at this stage,
28 the record does not contain sufficient information to determine whether such other devices are

1 economic substitutes or are merely complimentary to iOS devices.

2 Thus, and for other reasons, Apple’s market definition also faces hurdles. Antitrust law is
3 not concerned with individual consumers or producers, like Epic Games; it is concerned with
4 market aggregates. Substitutes may not deprive a monopolist of market power if they fail to affect
5 enough customers to make a price increase unprofitable. *See Theme Promotions*, 546 F.3d at 1002
6 (defining relevant market by whether a price increase would cause a “significant number” of
7 customers to substitute to make the price increase unprofitable). Alternatively, constraints among
8 some consumers may not render the market as a whole narrow. *See Telecor Commc’ns, Inc. v.*
9 *Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, 305 F.3d 1124, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting relevant
10 market definition based on a finding that “some” consumers could not substitute products because
11 the record did not show they were “significant enough to render the market as a whole non-cross-
12 elastic”). *But see Engelhard*, 126 F.3d at 1306 (noting that “it is possible for only a few customers
13 who switch to alternatives to make the price increase unprofitable, thereby protecting a larger
14 number of customers who would have acquiesced in higher . . . prices.”).

15 Here, both parties cite factors impacting the elasticity of their proposed markets. A final
16 determination may depend on the magnitude of those effects. For instance, focusing on *Fortnite*
17 alone, the record shows that (i) more than 116 million (out of 350 million) *Fortnite* players have
18 accessed *Fortnite* through the iOS platform; (ii) iOS players constitute roughly 10% of the daily
19 active *Fortnite* users since its iOS launch in April 2018; and (iii) 63% of *Fortnite* players on iOS
20 *only* play on the iOS platform. (Sweeney Decl. ¶ 3 (Dkt. No. 65).) Notably, the record is silent on
21 how often these 116 million individuals play *Fortnite* and devoid of information on the
22 characteristics of 10% of daily active users or whether these users access *Fortnite* through other
23 platforms. More broadly, there is no evidence regarding the size of the game app market
24 compared to other apps and whether they constitute a separate submarket with unique
25 characteristics that do not apply to other app developers.

26 Thus, the market definition rests on factual questions regarding the nature of the iOS
27 market as a whole: how *many* iOS users own multiple devices; how *many* iOS users would switch
28 to another device in response to a price increase; and how *many* producers can afford to forego

1 iOS customers altogether. Neither party adequately addresses these factual questions. Epic
2 Games assumes all iOS customers are the same, and Apple assumes that only Epic Games
3 customers are relevant.

4 Moreover, underlying these questions is a significant and unresolved dispute over
5 clustering. Apple focuses narrowly on game distribution channels because of the nature of Epic
6 Games' business. But courts have often combined different services together when "the product
7 package is significantly different from, and appeals to buyers on a different basis from, the
8 individual products considered separately." *Image Tech.*, 125 F.3d at 1204-05. For example, in
9 *United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Company*, the Supreme Court grouped
10 multiple financial services together into a relevant market of "commercial banking"—even though
11 they differed in their availability of substitutes—because customers generally obtain all banking
12 services from one place. 399 U.S. 350, 360-61 & n.4 (1970). Here, Epic Games may establish
13 that app distribution generally should be considered separately from app distribution of individual
14 games, which could have a significant impact on how alternative distribution channels are
15 evaluated.

16 Finally, underlying each of these issues is the question of perspective. Interchangeability
17 for purposes of the relevant market may vary depending on perspective. *See, e.g., Little Rock*
18 *Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health*, 591 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2009) (reversing relevant
19 market definition based on improper perspective); *Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc.*, 817 F.3d 849, 854-
20 55 (1st Cir. 2016) (same); *Telecor*, 305 F.3d at 1132-33 (same). Here, there are at least three
21 possible perspectives on the relevant market: (1) the customer who purchases the apps or games,
22 (2) the developer who makes the apps or games, and (3) the competing app store or digital
23 marketplace that distributes the apps or games. The parties adopt different perspectives, but
24 neither justifies its choice. And as the parties' briefing demonstrates, the resolution of this
25 question could lead to radically different analysis.

26 In short, without the record to define the relevant antitrust market, Epic Games has not
27 established likelihood of success as to monopoly maintenance, only serious questions. Further,
28 without such definition, the Court need not evaluate the second or third elements of the section 2

1 claim. Additionally, even under a section 2 claim, plaintiff must show anticompetitive conduct.
 2 One way to do so includes a rule a reason analysis. Given the overlap of this issue with a section
 3 1 claim, the Court addresses it below. *See, Qualcomm*, 969 F.3d at 991 (“The similarity of the
 4 burden-shifting tests under [sections] 1 and 2 means that courts often review claims under each
 5 section simultaneously.”).

6 3. *Tying under Section 1 of the Sherman Act*

7 a. Legal Framework

8 Tying arrangements under section 1 of the Sherman Act²⁰ may be evaluated under either
 9 per se or rule of reason analysis. *See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2, 29
 10 (1984), *abrogated on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.*, 547 U.S. 28 (2006).

11 Per se analysis allows “condemnation without inquiry into actual market conditions” based
 12 on precedent that deems certain contractual arrangements “unreasonable as a matter of law.” *Id.* at
 13 9, 15. “For a tying claim to suffer per se condemnation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the
 14 defendant tied together the sale of two distinct products or services; (2) that the defendant
 15 possesses enough economic power in the tying product market to coerce its customers into
 16 purchasing the tied product; and (3) that the tying arrangement affects a not insubstantial volume
 17 of commerce in the tied product market.”²¹ *Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth*, 515 F.3d 883,
 18 913 (9th Cir. 2008).

19 To assess the first element, courts apply the purchaser demand test, which “examines direct
 20 and indirect evidence of consumer demand and whether [a] defendant[] foreclosed competition on
 21 the merits in a product market distinct from the market for the tying item.” *Teradata*, 2018 WL
 22 6528009, at *12 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Direct evidence of demand includes

23 _____
 24 ²⁰ Section 1 of the Sherman Act broadly prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or
 25 conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. The term
 “restraint of trade” has been limited to “undue” (unreasonable) restraints. *Amex*, 138 S.Ct. at 2283.

26 ²¹ As explained in *Jefferson Parish*, “the essential characteristic of an invalid tying
 27 arrangement lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer
 28 into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred
 to purchase elsewhere on different terms.” 466 U.S. at 12. Per se condemnation is only
 appropriate where such forcing is “probable.” *Id.* at 15.

1 ‘whether, when given a choice, consumers purchase the tied good from the tying good maker, or
2 from other firms.’” *Id.* (quoting *Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters. LLC*, 532 F.3d 963, 975
3 (9th Cir. 2008)). “Indirect evidence includes firm behaviors, for instance a single product is
4 apparent if ‘competitive firms always bundle the tying and tied goods’ together.” *Id.* (quoting
5 *Rick-Mik*, 532 F.3d at 975). A tie requires a “condition linked to a sale.” *Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v.*
6 *Honeywell Int’l, Inc.*, 836 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016).

7 The second element of “forcing (or coercion) is likely if the seller has power in the tying
8 product market.” *CollegeNet, Inc. v. Common Application, Inc.*, 355 F. Supp. 3d 926, 955 (D. Or.
9 2018) (quoting *Robert’s Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc.*, 732 F.2d 1403,
10 1407 (9th Cir. 1984)). The third element asks “simply whether a total amount of business,
11 substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis, is foreclosed to
12 competitors by the tie” *Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969);
13 *see also Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 60 F.3d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (foreclosure of
14 a single purchaser sufficient so long as the dollar volume of sales is “not insubstantial”).

15 If a plaintiff fails to establish per se liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant
16 “violated the Sherman Act because it unreasonably restrained competition” under the rule of
17 reason. *Jefferson Parish*, 466 U.S. at 29. The rule of reason “requires courts to conduct a fact-
18 specific assessment of ‘market power and market structure . . . to assess the restraint’s actual
19 effect’ on competition.” *Amex*, 138 S.Ct. at 2284 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting *Copperweld*
20 *Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp.*, 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)). Recent cases suggest that the rule of
21 reason applies to any tying claim that “involves software that serves as a platform for third-party
22 applications.” *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d 34 at 89; *see also id.* at 95 (no per se claim where “the tying
23 product is software whose major purpose is to serve as a platform for third-party applications and
24 the tied product is complementary software functionality”).

25 “[T]he three-part burden-shifting test under the rule of reason is essentially the same” for
26 section 1 as for section 2 claims. *Qualcomm*, 969 F.3d at 991. First, plaintiff has “the initial
27 burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms
28 consumers in the relevant market.” *Amex*, 138 S. Ct. at 2284. That said, the Court need not

1 “consider whether competition was in fact unreasonably restrained.” *See Digidyne Corp. v. Data*
 2 *Gen. Corp.*, 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984). Second, if “the plaintiff carries its burden, then
 3 the burden shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint.” *Amex*, 138
 4 S. Ct. at 2284. Finally, “[i]f the defendant makes this showing, then the burden shifts back to the
 5 plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through
 6 less anticompetitive means.” *Id.*

7 *b. Per Se Tying Analysis*

8 Epic Games avers that Apple ties the iOS app distribution “product,” over which Apple has
 9 economic power, to a separate “product” of the IAP system. Based upon the current record, the
 10 Court concludes that Epic Games has not yet shown that the IAP system is a separate and distinct
 11 service from iOS app distribution sufficient to constitute a “tie” under antitrust law.

12 Where the allegedly tied product is an essential ingredient of the overall “method of
 13 business” with customers, courts view them as one product not as two tied together. *Rick-Mik*,
 14 532 F.3d at 974 (quoting *Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp.*, 776 F.2d 665, 670 n.1 (7th Cir
 15 1985)). That is especially true where the allegedly separate products have always been integrated.
 16 *See id.* at 975. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, payment processing can be part of a single
 17 integrated product. *See id.* at 974 (“The franchise and the method of processing credit transactions
 18 are not separate products, but part of a single product (the franchise).”).

19 Here, the IAP system appears to be integrated with the App Store and, historically, to have
 20 never been a separate product. If so, the construct of the IAP appears to reinforce the notion that
 21 the App Store is a digital marketplace where developers on the App Store are able to structure
 22 their business models however they choose.²² Many of these developers, like Epic Games,

23
 24 ²² Epic Games’ Best Buy and QuickBooks analogy misses the mark. Epic Games stated:

25 [W]hat Apple wants to do is to have the consumer go in to Best Buy,
 26 buy the Quick[B]ooks . . . pay for it there, that’s fine. That’s the app
 27 distribution. But then take it home, and every time you do your taxes
 28 or every time you close your books using Quick[B]ooks, after you
 have the product, to keep paying Best Buy every single time another
 30 percent. They are reaching into subsequent transactions.”

(Dkt. No. 50 at 50-51.) With respect to video games, however, at least two significant distinctions

1 structure these models so that the game or app is free, presumably to entice customers to download
2 the game or app initially, and only monetize the subsequent IAPs. The IAP system does not
3 appear to be a payment processor in the same way that Visa, Mastercard, or PayPal is a payment
4 processor; it is more akin to a link back to the App Store whereby the transaction must occur
5 *within* the digital confines of the App Store.²³ The IAP system appears to have been created, in
6 part, to capture the value of a developer being on the digital shelf of the App Store which is owed
7 to Apple—either on the initial download, or in subsequent IAPs.²⁴

8 Nevertheless, Epic Games raises serious questions about the existence of separate demand
9 for IAP-type services. Payment processing markets are ubiquitous outside of IAPs. Epic Games
10 offers indirect evidence of separate demand through analogy to these markets, including the
11 markets for the sale of physical goods sold through apps on the iOS platform. *See Rick-Mik*, 532
12 F.3d at 975. The experts disagree over whether the distinctions between IAP and these payment

13
14
15 exist. First, at a brick-and-mortar store, games were not distributed for free; that is, free-to-play
16 games like *Fortnite* did not exist. In the digital context, consumers can obtain some games for
17 free, and, under the license, no payment from Epic Games to Apple is due in that transaction.

18 Second, an analogous pre-digital marketplace transaction exists: namely, the sale of
19 expansion packs, which could unlock additional content for base version of games, including new
20 gameplay mechanics and functions. Consumers would initially purchase the base game from a
21 brick-and-mortar store. Assuming the expansion pack was not available at the time of purchase of
22 the base game, consumers were thereafter required to return to a store to purchase in a separate
23 transaction the expansion pack—thereby unlocking this additional content in the base game.

24 IAP appears to operate analogously: the base version of a game is required to play, but IAP
25 similarly unlocks additional content including new gameplay mechanics and functions. These
26 analogous pre-digital transactions suggest that IAP is not merely a payment processor, as Epic
27 Games contends, but rather an integrated part of the digital marketplace, permitting a prior
28 historical business model in the gaming industry. The Court highlights that neither party discusses
these analogous transactions, but the Court discloses that this conceptual similarity further colors
the Court's analysis, including the need for a more complete record. *See also Amex*, 138 S. Ct. at
2286-87 (discussing a transaction platform like the App Store, noting that it “facilitate[s] a single,
simultaneous transaction between” two parties).

²³ Indeed, it is the Court's understanding that all video game digital distribution
marketplaces require a consumer to similarly return to the marketplace to complete an IAP.

²⁴ The Court notes that the conceptualization of the IAP system as integrated within the
App Store may generally defeat a per se analysis. *Microsoft* suggests that perhaps the appropriate
lens to view a tying claim involving innovative technological business models is under the rule of
reason analysis, not under a per se tying analysis. *See Microsoft*, 253 F.3d 34 at 89-95.

1 processing services actually impact consumer demand.²⁵ (*Compare* Schmalensee Decl. ¶ 49 (Dkt.
2 No. 78) *with* Evans Reply Decl. ¶ 36 (Dkt. No. 88).) Moreover, Epic Games provides evidence
3 that developers have demanded their own in-app purchase payment processing services. (*See*
4 Evans Reply Decl. ¶ 45 (Dkt. No. 88).)

5 Epic Games further points to evidence in the record demonstrating that some customers
6 chose to use Epic Games’ payment processing service when given the choice with IAP. The
7 trouble with this argument is that it conflates competition on the merits with Epic Games’ goal of
8 avoiding Apple’s 30%. It is not surprising that some customers would choose competing payment
9 services if they provided lower prices offered only because of this non-payment. This does not
10 evidence separate demand for payment processing services, as much as a demand for alternatives
11 to Apple’s “integrated services” of iOS app distribution. When framed in this way, Epic Games’
12 argument is no more than a collateral attack on Apple’s App Store model, not a demonstration of
13 separate demand. In this respect, Epic Games’ strongest argument—left woefully underexplored
14 in the record—lies with competition on *other* features provided by IAP, such as customer service,
15 parental controls, and security.²⁶ This evidence suggests that a more fully developed record could

16
17 ²⁵ The question of perspective underlies the tying claim as much as the monopolization
18 claim. In *Rick-Mik*, the court found that “[t]he relevant ‘purchaser’ is the franchisee (not the
19 general consumer)” for purposes of separate demand for credit card processing services. 532 F.3d
at 975. Here, the equivalent of the franchisee is the developer, which may demonstrate stronger
“separate demand” for payment processing services than the user who makes the purchases.

20 ²⁶ Epic Games shows that at least some developers have demanded separate payment
21 processing services based on these features, independent of Apple’s 30%. For example, Epic
22 Games claims the CEO of the company “Hey,” which provides email service, made the following
statement months before Epic Games’ motion:

23 [A]s the owner of a business, this isn’t just about money. Money
24 grabs the headlines, but there’s a far more elemental story here. It’s
about the absence of choice, and how Apple forcibly inserts
themselves between your company and your customer. . . .

25 When Apple forces companies to offer In App Purchases in order to
26 be on their platform, they also dictate the limits to which you can help
your customer. This has a detrimental impact on the customer
27 experience, and your relationship with your customer. It can flat out
ruin an interaction, damage your reputation, and it can literally cost
28 you customers. It prevents us from providing exceptional customer
service when someone who uses our product needs help.

1 plausibly show demand for a separate product.

2 Should Epic Games satisfy the “purchaser demand” test for finding distinct products, it
3 may prevail on the remaining elements under the per se tying analysis. While Apple claims that it
4 does not “tie” IAP to iOS app distribution because developers may choose other business models,
5 it does not dispute that its App Store Review Guidelines require the IAP system’s use for IAPs as
6 a condition of app distribution. (*See* Schiller Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 33, 41 (Dkt. No. 74).) This
7 requirement manifests the coercion, that is, developers who offer IAP must do so on Apple’s
8 terms. Apple also does not dispute that it holds market power in the iOS app distribution market
9 and that the alleged tie affects a substantial volume of commerce in in-app payment processing.
10 Accordingly, Epic Games raises serious questions with regard to per se tying, but fails to
11 demonstrate the likelihood of success due to lack of evidence of “purchaser demand” for IAP
12 processing service separate from the “integrated service” of app distribution.²⁷

13 c. Rule of Reason Analysis

14 The rule of reason analysis is more fact specific than the per se analysis. Here, the first
15 element focuses on the harm to competition and consumers. Epic Games errs by focusing on harm
16 to competitors, and for that reason has not sustained its burden at this juncture.²⁸

17 _____
18 (Evans Reply Decl. ¶ 45 & n.40 (Dkt. No. 88).) This statement suggests that the IAP dispute is
19 not simply about Apple’s fee, but also about whether “the world’s largest company [gets] to
20 decide how millions of other businesses can interact with their own customers.” *See* Jason Fried,
“Our CEO’s take on Apple’s App Store payment policies, and their impact on our relationship
with our customers,” HEY (June 19, 2020), *available at* <https://hey.com/apple/iap/>.

21 ²⁷ Commentators have suggested that separate demand is a “threshold requirement” for
22 separate products, following which defendant may show that the products are nevertheless a single
23 product due to their being an “integrated service.” *See* Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 1743 (4th Ed.
2020). *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 147 F.3d 935, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1998), lays out the
general requirements for an integrated service.

24 ²⁸ Nevertheless, for the same reasons as described for separate demand under the per se
25 analysis, the Court can envision a plausible case for anticompetitive effect given the serious
26 questions referenced above regarding Apple’s IAP restrictions and whether they reduce consumer
27 choice or increase price due to exclusionary conduct. *See Qualcomm*, 969 F.3d at 990.
28 Competitors could conceivably provide equal or superior services than IAP— better security,
better customer service, and better parental controls. Moreover, Epic Games may be able to prove
anticompetitive effects even if it cannot show separate products: *Microsoft* suggests that the
separate-products test “is a rough proxy for whether a tying arrangement may [be] . . . unsuited to
per se condemnation,” not a determination of ultimate efficiency. 253 F.3d at 87.

1 Even if it had, Apple, of course, offers a procompetitive justification consistent with step
2 two of the three-part burden shifting analysis. Apple claims that the IAP provides the business
3 mechanism for it to be paid for the App Store given its support of 1.8 million apps, of which 84
4 percent are free, to 1.5 billion Apple devices and 900 million iPhone users. Apple claims that IAP
5 also provides: (1) a “centralized, convenient way” to transact online, (2) security and fraud
6 protection, (3) refunds and customer support from Apple, (4) parental controls, and (5)
7 comprehensive list of purchases,” all of which are facially reasonable. (Schiller Decl. ¶ 36 (Dkt.
8 No. 74); *see also* Schmalensee Decl. ¶ 29 (Dkt. No. 78).) That developers may not want to pay a
9 commission or licensing fee does not necessarily translate to antitrust behavior.

10 Under a rule of reason analysis, the burden shifts back to Epic Games to demonstrate that
11 the “procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive
12 means.” Here, the record is not fully developed, and mixed, at best. Competitors could
13 conceivably provide equal or superior services. Indeed, it is entirely plausible that app developers
14 could provide better refunds and customer support for goods purchased through their own apps
15 than can Apple, or not. As noted, the sale of physical goods sold on the iOS already uses separate
16 payment processors or mechanisms outside of the Apple IAP system. On the other hand, Apple
17 has produced evidence that its security features are more effective than its competitors, a basis on
18 which it competes. Thus, the dispute likely comes down to whether these features and Apple’s
19 monetization can be achieved through less anti-competitive means. The record on these issues is
20 thin, as is any briefing on the method of proof given the frontier on which the questions sit.

21 4. Summary

22 For the reasons set forth above, Epic Games has shown that serious questions exist with
23 respect to its section 1 and section 2 claims against Apple but has not proven a likelihood of
24 success on the merits on this record.

25 B. Irreparable Harm

26 As the Court stated in the temporary restraining order: the issue of irreparable harm
27 focuses on the harm caused by *not maintaining the status quo*, as opposed to the separate and
28 distinct element of a remedy under the likelihood of success factor. Here, once again, the Court’s

1 evaluation is guided by the general notion that “self-inflicted wounds are not irreparable injury.”
 2 *Al Otro Lado v. Wolf*, 952 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting *Second City Music, Inc. v. City*
 3 *of Chicago*, 333 F.3d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 2003)). Further courts generally decline to find
 4 irreparable harm that “results from the express terms of [the] contract.” *See Salt Lake Tribune*
 5 *Publ’g Co., LLC v. AT&T Corp.*, 320 F.3d 1081, 1106 (10th Cir. 2003) (no irreparable harm
 6 where the alleged harm “results from the express terms of [the] contract”). Quite simply,
 7 irreparable harm is harm or injury that cannot be repaired.

8 *I. Fortnite*

9 Epic Games contests the Court’s prior determination with respect to *Fortnite*, namely that
 10 no irreparable harm exists where Epic Games *chose* to breach its agreements with Apple in
 11 enacting its own direct IAP system. Epic Games cites to precedent involving affirmative defenses
 12 to argue that the Court should not aid in the enforcement of contracts that are anti-competitive and
 13 violative of antitrust laws. *See generally McMullen v. Hoffman*, 174 U.S. 639, 654 (1899) (“The
 14 authorities from the earliest times to the present unanimously hold that no court will lend its
 15 assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of an illegal contract.”); *Memorex Corp. v.*
 16 *Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.*, 555 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[Courts should] continue to side
 17 with the goal of vigorous enforcement of our antitrust laws.”); *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l*
 18 *Parts Corp.*, 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (“[T]he purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by
 19 insuring that private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business
 20 behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.”); *Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins*, 455 U.S. 72, 83-84
 21 (1982) (enforcement of “private agreements” is subject to “the restrictions and limitations of the
 22 public policy of the United States”). Epic Games concedes that these affirmative defenses are
 23 procedurally not at issue. Instead, it claims it should “not be penalized for defying Apple’s
 24 monopolistic edicts” (Mot. at 23 (Dkt. No. 61 at 30)), and that the Court should proactively extend
 25 the principle in support of Epic Games’ proffer of irreparable injury.

26 Epic Games further avers that ongoing harm continues to its reputation, the *Fortnite*
 27 gaming community, and its ongoing ambitions in the creation of a metaverse. In support, Epic
 28 Games introduces declarations attesting to a 60% decline in the number of iOS users in *Fortnite*,

1 and that those who continue to play are doing so for significantly fewer hours per week, given that
 2 these players are stuck on earlier version of the game and unable to play with other individuals.
 3 (Sweeney Decl. ¶ 22 (Dkt. No. 65).) Next, Epic Games provides records reflecting customer
 4 complaints and online comments about the unavailability of *Fortnite* on the iOS platform. (*Id.* ¶¶
 5 25-26, Exs. E-F (Dkt. Nos. 65-5, 65-6); Byars Decl., Ex. Q (Dkt. No. 61-18).) Indeed, Epic
 6 Games argues that “[m]any of these customers blame Epic [Games] for being cut off from access
 7 to *Fortnite*.” (Mot. at 27 (Dkt. No. 61 at 34).) Finally, Epic Games includes declarations attesting
 8 to difficulty in creating and sustaining a metaverse in the *Fortnite* community given that it is no
 9 longer on the iOS platform.

10 Epic Games does not persuade. The cited cases are singularly premised on the fact that the
 11 consequences from a breach of contract in which the parties are seeking to escape are *actually* in
 12 violation of antitrust laws in the United States.²⁹ As discussed, the Court has made no such
 13 finding in this Order as to Epic Games’ likelihood of success on the merits beyond only finding
 14 serious questions as to the merits. This is especially so where the alleged monopolistic practices
 15 and conduct concern innovative technology platforms without analogous prior precedent.
 16 Moreover, the Court considers countervailing interests in ensuring that antitrust laws are *not*
 17 otherwise stretched into areas that are beyond what is required or contemplated. *See Kelly v.*
 18 *Kosuga*, 358 U.S. 516, 519 (1959) (“Obviously . . . federal courts should not be quick to create a
 19 policy of nonenforcement of contracts beyond that which is clearly the requirement of the
 20 Sherman Act.”); *Germon v. Times Mirror Co.*, 520 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The purposes
 21 of the antitrust laws deal with promoting competition, not with extending unsatisfactory
 22 contractual relationships beyond their stipulated periods of effectiveness.”).

23 In short, Epic Games cannot simply exclaim “monopoly” to rewrite agreements giving
 24

25 ²⁹ Epic Games’ citation to *Acquire v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.*, 24 F.3d 401 (2d Cir.
 26 1994) is markedly distinguishable. As Apple correctly notes, *Acquire* involved a defendant who
 27 made after-the-fact changes to its policies, did not even comply with its own stated policy, and the
 28 plaintiffs made a showing that they would be driven out of business absent an injunction. *Id.* at
 412. None of these facts are present, where Apple has maintained the same policies since the
 inception of the App Store, and there is no evidence in the record that Epic Games will be driven
 out of business based on the unavailability of *Fortnite* on the iOS platform.

1 itself unilateral benefit. Its other identified bases: damage to its reputation³⁰ and the *Fortnite*
 2 gaming community cannot constitute irreparable harm where such harm flows from Epic Games’
 3 own actions and its strategic decision to breach its agreements with Apple.³¹ While consumers are
 4 feeling the impact of this litigation, the fact remains: these are business disputes. A putative class
 5 action on behalf of *all* developers on these *exact same issues* was already in progress when Epic
 6 Games breached the agreements. *See Cameron*, 4:19-cv-03074-YGR. Yet, Epic Games has never
 7 adequately explained its rush, other than its disdain for the situation. The current predicament is
 8 of its own making. *See Second City Music*, 333 F.3d at 850 (“Only the injury inflicted by one’s
 9 adversary counts for this purpose.”).³²

10 Epic Games remains free to maintain its agreements with Apple in breach status as this
 11 litigation continues and ignore what the Seventh Circuit recognized in *Second City Music*: “[t]he
 12 sensible way to proceed is for [Epic Games to comply with the agreements and guidelines] and
 13 continue to operate while it builds a record.” *Id.* There is no loss of face *if* one’s goal is to protect
 14 its consumers, the *Fortnite* player base. To assist, the Court even offered to require the 30% be
 15 placed in escrow pending resolution of the trial which Epic Games flatly rejected.³³ The refusal to
 16

17 ³⁰ Even reviewing the record before the Court, the Court is not persuaded that Epic Games
 18 has suffered reputational harm. Epic Games unleashed a pre-planned and scorching marketing
 19 campaign against Apple following its breach of the operating agreements and guidelines. As the
 20 Court noted at oral arguments, if anything, it appears Epic Games’ actions have only increased its
 21 reputation in the wider community.

22 ³¹ It is further difficult to conceive how Epic Games’ own ongoing ambitions in the
 23 creation of a metaverse would create a basis for a finding of irreparable injury.

24 ³² Indeed, *Second City Music* is illustrative for *why* Epic Games’ actions cannot constitute
 25 irreparable harm. In *Second City Music*, the plaintiff-appellant challenged a city ordinance as
 26 unconstitutionally vague—not merely violative of a statutory regime. 333 F.3d at 847. The
 27 Seventh Circuit found that “some real injury may lurk beneath the surface . . . but evaluating this
 28 possibility requires evidence so far missing from the record.” *Id.* at 850. Likewise, as discussed,
 the record here is inadequate for the Court to conclude that the agreements and guidelines are
 violative of antitrust laws such that Epic Games truly has irreparable harm as to *Fortnite*.

³³ As made apparent at the oral argument, Apple’s form letter purportedly banning Epic
 Games from the iOS platform for a one-year period is no barrier to Epic Games’ return to the iOS
 platform during the pendency of this litigation. (Dkt. No. 111 at 83-84.) As Apple stated at the
 hearing, Epic Games is able to return to the App Store under the Court’s supervision provided that
 Epic Games complies with the relevant agreements and guidelines and further pays Apple its

1 do so suggests Epic Games is not principally concerned with iOS consumers, but rather, harbors
 2 other tactical motives. Certainly, no technical issue exists. Epic Games admits that the
 3 technology exists to “fix” the problem easily by deactivating the “hotfix.” Thus, given the totality
 4 of these circumstances, the Court can easily find that the injury Epic Games “incurs by following a
 5 different course is of its own choosing.” *Second City Music*, 333 F.3d at 850. It is self-harm
 6 caused by self-help.³⁴ Accordingly, Epic Games has failed to demonstrate irreparable harm as to
 7 *Fortnite* and the games under the Epic Games developer account.

8 2. *Epic Affiliates*

9 By contrast, with respect to Unreal Engine and the Epic Affiliates, the Court concludes that
 10 Epic Games has made a sufficient showing as to the irreparable harm. As the Court previously
 11 found:

12 Apple is hard-pressed to dispute that even if Epic Games succeeded
 13 on the merits, it could be too late to save all the projects by third-party
 14 developers relying on the engine that were shelved while support was
 15 unavailable. Indeed, such a scenario would likely lead to nebulous,
 hard-to-quantify questions, such as, how successful these other
 projects might have been, and how much in royalties would have been
 generated, much less the collateral damage to the third-party
 developers themselves

16 *Epic Games*, 2020 WL 5073937, at 4 (Dkt. No. 48 at 6). Apple does not challenge these prior
 17 findings. Indeed, there is ample evidence in the record demonstrating: (1) that the removal of
 18 developer tools could have significant irreparable harm to Unreal Engine and to Epic Games and
 19 its affiliates; and (2) that Apple’s threat to revoke developer tools (SDKs) from Unreal Engine is
 20 already having a negative impact on Unreal Engine. (*See* Sweeney Decl. ¶¶ 38, 40 (Dkt. No. 65);
 21 Penwarden Decl. ¶¶ 8-13 (Dkt. No. 64); Byars Decl., Exs. R (Dkt. No. 61-19), S ¶¶ 3-4 (Dkt. No.
 22 61-20).) In this regard, Epic Games could not otherwise be made whole even if victorious at trial.

23 _____
 24 commission on the IAP that occurred after the breach on August 13, 2020. (*Id.*)

25 ³⁴ Epic Games’ argument that people are incorrectly blaming Epic Games for the
 26 unavailability of *Fortnite* on the iOS platform ignores the record in this matter. The decision of
 27 whether to return *Fortnite* to the iOS platform during the pendency of this litigation rests with
 28 Epic Games—not Apple. Indeed, Epic Games has a choice, and it has exercised this choice by
 weighing its own beliefs and principles as to the alleged illegality of the Apple agreements and
 guidelines above its interest in continuing to provide iOS users with access to *Fortnite*. As noted,
 Epic Games is free to make that choice; but it is Epic Games’ choice nonetheless.

1 *See trueEX, LLC v. MarkitSERV Ltd.*, 266 F.Supp.3d 705, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“trueEX is likely
2 also to suffer irreparable harm . . . [as] some [customers] have threatened to stop doing business
3 with trueEX Another client sought to accelerate a number of planned trades . . . suggesting
4 that the client did not believe it could do business with trueEX in the future”).

5 Instead, Apple advances three arguments: (1) Apple has a well-established practice of
6 removing affiliated developer accounts and developer tools (SDKs) in similar circumstances based
7 on broad language in the agreements and guidelines (Schiller Decl. ¶¶ 54-55, Ex. C at 2); (2) the
8 harm to Unreal Engine is also self-inflicted harm and cannot be irreparable harm; and (3) Epic
9 Games and/or its affiliates could insert and distribute secret code in Unreal Engine and the other
10 applications remaining on the iOS and macOS platforms.

11 Apple does not persuade. It is clear from the record that Apple’s long-standing practice of
12 removing affiliated accounts based on broad language regarding termination in the relevant
13 agreements and guidelines would generally be permissible. However, as applied to the specific
14 facts, the Court concludes that this matter presents an exception to the ordinary practices. The
15 Court notes that the totality of facts is *not* overwhelming for either side, but leans towards Epic
16 Games on this topic. On the one hand, facts weighing in favor of Apple include: the agreements
17 are at-will; the developer accounts for both Epic International and Epic Games list the same
18 taxpayer identification number; a single individual is listed as the registered account holder for
19 both accounts; a single credit card paid for both accounts; share the same test devices; the accounts
20 were renewed within a minute of each other; and Epic International receives customer payments
21 made by iOS *Fortnite* users who are playing outside the United States. On the other hand, facts
22 weighing in favor of Epic Games, Epic International, and other Epic Affiliates include: each have
23 separate agreements with Apple; each of the Epic Affiliates pays separate consideration (*i.e.*
24 annual developer fees); all agreements were renewed at separate times; the Epic Affiliates’
25 agreements have not otherwise been breached; and Epic International has been represented by
26 Epic Games to be a different legal entity despite overlapping financial accounts (*e.g.* credit cards,
27 taxpayer identification number, etc.). Additionally, despite the inclusion of broad termination
28 language in the agreements, the relevant agreement governing developer tools (SDKs), the Apple

1 Xcode and Apple SDKs Agreement, is a fully integrated document that explicitly excludes the
2 developer program license agreement.

3 Although it is a close question, the Court finds that, with respect to access to the developer
4 tools (SDKs), Apple's reaching into separate agreements with separate entities appears to be
5 retaliatory, especially where these agreements have not been otherwise breached. Indeed, the form
6 letter first issued by Apple in response to Epic Games' breach does not mention Unreal Engine or
7 the possibility of Apple revoking the developer tools (SDKs). However, after the commencement
8 of this lawsuit, Apple apparently sent a more personalized letter *specifically* identifying and
9 targeting Unreal Engine as a consequence of Epic Games' breach. Significantly, the letter does
10 not otherwise identify or list *any* other specific application or software at risk from Epic Games or
11 any of the Epic Affiliates. (*See* Grant Decl. ¶ 27, Ex. C (Dkt. No. 63-3 at 3-4) ("You will also lose
12 access to the following programs, technologies, and capabilities: . . . Engineering efforts to
13 improve hardware and software performance of Unreal Engine on Mac and iOS hardware;
14 optimize Unreal Engine on the Mac for creative workflows, virtual sets and their CI/Build
15 Systems; and adoption and support of ARKit features and future VR features into Unreal Engine
16 by their XR team.")) The subtext of the letter where one, and only one, significant product is
17 mentioned evidences that Apple was impermissibly pressuring and retaliating against Epic Games
18 and the Epic Affiliates on Unreal Engine product.

19 Apple's remaining two arguments are also without merit. Apple has not shown that Epic
20 Games' breach with respect to *Fortnite* results in a breach of agreements with Epic International
21 or the Epic Affiliates. In the normal course of business, parties can terminate such at will
22 agreements pursuant to their express terms. Here though, Apple reaches beyond these separate
23 agreements to inflict harm, or pressure, upon Epic Games and the Epic Affiliates. In this regard,
24 the injury cannot be said to be self-inflicted.

25 Finally, the Court is not persuaded by Apple's exaggerated claims that Epic Games would
26 insert hidden or malicious code into Unreal Engine or its products to damage the iOS platform.

1 The record is devoid of any evidence to support such a finding or inference.³⁵ To the extent any
 2 valid concern exists, however, it is easily remedied by narrowing the scope of the injunction to
 3 permit Epic Affiliates' continued access to the developer tools (SDKs) and to the App Store only
 4 so long as such applications and the Epic Affiliates remain in continued compliance with the terms
 5 of the relevant agreements and guidelines.

6 The Court notes that expanded briefing by Apple on the agreements and its historical
 7 practice has made this a closer question than was presented earlier. On balance, however, and in
 8 light of the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that ongoing irreparable harm and significant
 9 potential irreparable harm to Unreal Engine exist absent a preliminary injunction.

10 C. Balance of Equities

11 1. *Fortnite*

12 As the Court stated in its prior order:

13 The battle between Epic Games and Apple has apparently been
 14 brewing for some time. It is not clear why *now* became so urgent.
 15 The *Cameron* case which addresses the same issues has been pending
 16 for over a year, and yet, both Epic Games and Apple remain
 17 successful market players. If plaintiffs there, or here, prevail,
 18 monetary damages will be available and injunctive relief requiring a
 19 change in practice will likely be required. Epic Games moves this
 20 Court to allow it to access Apple's platform for free while it makes
 21 money on each purchase made on the same platform. While the Court
 22 anticipates experts will opine that Apple's 30 percent take is anti-
 23 competitive, the Court doubts that an expert would suggest a zero
 24 percent alternative. Not even Epic Games gives away its products for
 25 free.

21 ³⁵ Further, to do so would be tactically disastrous for Epic Games and its affiliates as it
 22 would prove Apple's point with respect to its need to maintain its walled garden or closed
 23 platform to protect iOS consumers against security attacks.

24 Moreover, Apple's arguments—that Mr. Sweeney's statements to Apple announcing the
 25 breach reflect a risk to the iOS platform—do not persuade. Mr. Sweeney states that should Apple
 26 reject its demands for the ability to introduce a separate app market and use a different payment
 27 processor, then Epic Games will be in conflict with Apple on “a multitude of fronts - creative,
 28 technical, business, and legal - for so long as it takes to bring about change.” (Sweeney Decl., Ex.
 D (Dkt. No. 65-4).) These statements appear hyperbolic, but even a generous reading in Apple's
 favor does not reflect any intent to harm the iOS platform with respect to the Unreal Engine or the
 other applications that are under other affiliates' developer accounts. Indeed, Unreal Engine does
 not even utilize the App Store or itself offer IAP, as it is a graphics engine available to developers
 on computer platforms. It is hard to determine how the Unreal Engine would or could be used to
 try to affect such changes as described in the above cited correspondence.

1 Thus, in focusing on the status quo, the Court observes that Epic
2 Games strategically chose to breach its agreements with Apple which
3 changed the status quo. No equities have been identified suggesting
4 that the Court should impose a *new* status quo in favor of Epic Games.

5 *Epic Games*, 2020 WL 5073937, at 4 (Dkt. No. 48 at 6).

6 The Court’s prior findings remain instructive in addressing the parties’ arguments: Epic
7 Games advances two arguments for why the balance of equities tilt sharply in its favor with
8 respect to *Fortnite*. First, Epic Games dismisses Apple’s concern that an injunction with respect
9 to *Fortnite* would set off a rash of other developers breaching their agreements, and asserts that
10 any harm to Apple would be limited to loss of commissions for a short time, “which is harm easily
11 compensable by damages.” (Mot. at 30 (Dkt. No. 61 at 37).) Second, the balance tilts towards
12 Epic Games where the injunction seeks to ensure that Apple complies with antitrust laws.

13 Epic Games does not persuade on either of these two bases. As discussed, Epic Games has
14 not made a preliminary showing of the likelihood of success on its claim. Therefore, it is not yet
15 established that such an injunction reinstating *Fortnite* would issue in compliance with antitrust
16 laws. Moreover, Epic Games’ argument with respect to damages only demonstrates that the harm
17 to *Fortnite* is *not* irreparable. As Epic Games states, the loss of commissions to Apple would be
18 for a short duration and would be “easily compensable” The converse is also true.

19 Finally, the Court finds that the balance of equities weighs toward Apple where Epic
20 Games breached both its agreements and the guidelines, and an injunction would potentially
21 incentivize similar breaches among developers. Epic Games does not dispute that it breached its
22 agreements. Nor is a breach required to maintain or even commence this lawsuit as reflected by
23 the fact that the named plaintiffs in *Cameron* did not breach their agreements. As explained
24 herein, Epic Games can similarly proceed. The Court declines to incentivize breaches of contracts
25 where the legality of those provisions has not yet been conclusively or presumptively determined
26 to be illegal.

27 In sum, no equities have been identified suggesting that the Court should impose a *new*
28 status quo in favor of Epic Games. The balance of equities tilts sharply toward Apple on the issue
29 of *Fortnite*.

2. *Epic Affiliates*

By contrast, the Court finds that the balance of equities weighs in favor of Epic Games and the Epic Affiliates, including as to Unreal Engine, on the issue of continued access to developer tools and the App Store for the Epic Affiliates. As the Court previously found:

[W]ith respect to the Unreal Engine and the developer tools, the Court finds the opposite result. In this regard, the contracts related to those applications were not breached. Apple does not persuade that it will be harmed based on any restraint on removing the developer tools. The parties' dispute is easily cabined on the antitrust allegations with respect to the App Store. It need not go farther. Apple has chosen to act severely, and by doing so, has impacted non-parties, and a third-party developer ecosystem. In this regard, the equities do weigh against Apple.

Epic Games, 2020 WL 5073937, at 4 (Dkt. No. 48 at 6). The Court finds that this analysis remains unchanged. The only equity that Apple has identified concerns an alleged potential “trojan horse” or insertion of malicious code by Epic Games or the Epic Affiliates. The Court rejects this argument for the same reasons discussed under the irreparable harm factor. The modification in the preliminary injunction to ensure continued compliance with the operating agreements and guidelines addresses this issue.

Apple's aggressive targeting of separate contracts in an attempt to eradicate Epic Games and its affiliates fully from the iOS platform was unnecessary and imperiled a thriving third-party developer ecosystem. Providing continued access for the Epic Affiliates to developer tools and the App Store preserves the status quo. Accordingly, the balance of equities tilts sharply toward Epic Games on the issue of continued access to developer tools and the App Store for the Epic Affiliates.

D. Public Interest

“[T]he public interest inquiry primarily addresses the impact on non-parties rather than parties.” *HiQ Labs*, 938 F.3d at 1004 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The plaintiffs bear the initial burden of showing that the injunction is in the public interest.” *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109, 1139 (9th Cir. 2009). The current briefing does not change significantly the parties' initial submissions or the Court's findings, which it reaffirms:

1 With respect to the gaming requests, the Court recognizes based on
 2 the numerous internet postings and comments submitted in the record
 3 that *Fortnite* players are passionate supporters of the game, and
 4 eagerly anticipate its return to the iOS platform. The Court further
 5 recognizes that during these coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19)
 6 times, virtual escapes may assist in connecting people and providing
 7 a space that is otherwise unavailable. However, the showing is not
 8 sufficient to conclude that these considerations outweigh the general
 9 public interest in requiring private parties to adhere to their
 10 contractual agreements or in resolving business disputes through
 11 normal, albeit expedited, proceedings. *See S. Glazer's Distrib. of*
 12 *Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co.*, 860 F.3d 844, 853 (6th Cir.
 13 2017) (declining to enjoin termination of contract according to its
 14 terms because the “public has a strong interest in holding private
 15 parties to their agreements”).

9 With respect to the Unreal Engine and the developer tools, the
 10 calculus changes. The record shows potential significant damage to
 11 both the Unreal Engine platform itself, and to the gaming industry
 12 generally, including on both third-party developers and gamers. The
 13 public context in which this injury arises differs significantly: not only
 14 has the underlying agreement not been breached, but the economy is
 15 in dire need of increasing avenues for creativity and innovation, not
 16 eliminating them. Epic Games and Apple are at liberty to litigate
 17 against each other, but their dispute should not create havoc to
 18 bystanders. . . .

15 *Epic Games*, 2020 WL 5073937, at 4 (Dkt. No. 48 at 7).

16 As to *Fortnite*, nothing has changed in the prior analysis. The Court has empathy for
 17 *Fortnite* players regarding the continued unavailability of the game on the iOS platform. This is
 18 especially so during these continued difficult times that is the COVID-19 pandemic era, where
 19 gaming and virtual worlds are both social and safe. However, there is significant public interest in
 20 requiring parties to adhere to their contractual agreements or in resolving business disputes
 21 through the normal course.³⁶ Thus, the public interest factor weighs in favor of Apple as to
 22 *Fortnite*.

23 The record has also remained the same as to the Epic Affiliate accounts and Unreal Engine.
 24 The record demonstrates potential significant damage to both developers and gamers absent the
 25 issuance of a preliminary injunction. Indeed, many games on iOS and on other platforms,

26
 27 ³⁶ Epic Games cites authority that it is not in the public interest to enforce illegal contracts.
 28 Of course, these cases presuppose a showing on the illegality of the contract, which Epic Games
 has not yet done, and are therefore inapposite.

1 including *Fortnite* competitor *PUBG*, are built using Unreal Engine and rely on the engine
2 remaining compatible with future Apple software updates. Without the ability to update the
3 underlying engine for these and other games, the gaming industry built upon developers and
4 fervent consumers, including iOS consumers, will be unnecessarily impacted. Moreover, the need
5 for increasing avenues for creativity and innovation has not abated since the prior order. If
6 anything, the continued ongoing pandemic has demonstrated the imperative for substantial digital
7 and virtual innovation. Epic Games and Apple are at liberty to litigate this action for the future of
8 the digital frontier, but their dispute should not create havoc to bystanders. Thus, the public
9 interest weighs overwhelmingly in favor of Unreal Engine and the Epic Affiliates.

10 **E. Weighing of Factors**

11 In sum, the Court finds that based upon the record before it, the *Winter* factors weigh
12 **against** granting a preliminary injunction based on Epic Games' requests as to *Fortnite* and other
13 games and **in favor** of granting a preliminary injunction order as the Epic Affiliates effected
14 developer tools, including as to Unreal Engine.

15 **IV. CONCLUSION**

16 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court **GRANTS IN PART** and **DENIES IN PART**
17 the motion for preliminary injunction.

18 **THEREFORE, APPLE AND ALL PERSONS IN ACTIVE CONCERT OR PARTICIPATION WITH**
19 **APPLE, ARE PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED** from taking adverse action against the Epic Affiliates
20 with respect to restricting, suspending or terminating the Epic Affiliates from the Apple's
21 Developer Program, on the basis that Epic Games enabled IAP direct processing in *Fortnite*
22 through means other than the Apple IAP system, or on the basis of the steps Epic Games took to
23 do so. This preliminary injunction shall remain in effect during the pendency of this litigation
24 unless the Epic Affiliates breach: (1) any of their governing agreements with Apple, or (2) the
25 operative App Store guidelines. This preliminary injunction **SUPERSEDES** the prior temporary
26 restraining order.

27 For the reasons set forth above, this preliminary injunction is **EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY**
28 and will remain in force until the disposition of this case. Neither party has requested a security

1 bond and the Court finds that none is necessary as contemplated under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). *See*
2 *Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills*, 321 F.3d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 2003)
3 (“The district court is afforded wide discretion in setting the amount of the bond, . . . and the bond
4 amount may be zero if there is no evidence the party will suffer damages from the injunction.”).

5 This Order terminates Docket Number 61.

6 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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8 Dated: October 9, 2020



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YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

United States District Court
Northern District of California